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The aim of this article is to assess the European Union’s (EU) engagement with and within the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states in the field of non-traditional 
security (NTS) between 1997 and 2009, prior to the Lisbon Treaty becoming effective. The analysis 
concentrates on the EU’s response to five NTS crises and the interregional level of interaction 
from a sector-specific governance and social-constructivist approach. These crises are the avian 
influenza, the political conflict and the tsunami in Aceh, the Bali bombings and the Asian financial 
crisis (AFC) in South-East Asia. The case studies illustrate EU NTS action and gauge EU NTS 
actorness from a South-East Asian perspective to substantiate the EU’s interregional interaction 
and external actorness quality in specific fields of governance in a region so far away.
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Dieser Artikel analysiert die Zusammenarbeit der Europäischen Union (EU) mit den Mitglieds-
staaten  der  Vereinigung  südostasiatischer  Nationen  (ASEAN)  im  Bereich  nicht-traditioneller 
Sicherheit (NTS) zwischen 1997 und 2009, also noch vor Inkrafttreten des Vertrages von Lissabon. 
Fünf NTS-Krisen (Vogelgrippe, politischer Konflikt und Tsunami in Aceh, Bombenanschläge auf Bali 
sowie Asien-Finanzkrise), die Reaktionen der EU auf diese, sowie die entsprechenden Interaktionen 
auf der interregionalen Kooperationsebene stehen im Mittelpunkt der Analyse, welche einen 
sozialkonstruktivistischen und sektorspezifischen Governance-Ansatz verfolgt. Die Fallstudien 
legen die NTS-Aktivitäten der EU dar und bieten eine Einschätzung ihrer Akteursqualität aus 
südostasiatischer  Perspektive.  Des  Weiteren  wird  versucht,  die  Qualität  der  interregionalen 
europäisch-südostasiatischen  Interaktionen  und  der  EU-Akteursqualität  in  ausgewählten 
Governance-Bereichen in einer derart weit entfernten Region darzustellen.
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Introduction
I believe that the EU and Asia, and ASEAN in particular, have continued to build upon a warm and 
enduring friendship, based on shared values and interests and common understanding. And I remain 
convinced, that over the longer term, the solid foundations of this lasting friendship may prove to have 
been a much better basis on which to construct a stronger future economic partnership, rather than a 
sudden whirlwind romance leading to a potentially equally quick and acrimonious divorce! (O’Sullivan, 
2006, pp. 9-10)
Solidarity, partnership and friendship are among the many terms in the European 
Union’s (EU) rhetoric towards the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). 
The  question  here  is  whether  this  rhetoric  of  amity  translates  into  factual  and 
tangible interaction of a true friendship2. Or are these merely flowery phrases that 
are actually not substantiated by EU agency beyond economically motivated action? 
Is the EU a friend in deed and not merely a friend in rhetoric? 
To substantiate the EU’s actorness3 when South-East Asia is in need, the analysis 
will focus on a selection of distinctive cases of non-traditional security (NTS) crises 
in South-East Asia that have had a devastating impact prompting external assistance. 
The article will examine co-operation in the multilateral frameworks of the ASEAN-
EU dialogue and the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), and allude to other multilateral 
institutions where the two regional organisations and their member states meet, 
to  draw  conclusions  on  actual  European  NTS  actorness  and  visibility  and  the 
interregional  ASEAN-EU  level  of  contribution  to  tackling  the  crises.  The  ASEAN 
member states constitute the sociological other of the EU’s interregional interaction 
defining EU security actorness according to their security conceptualisation. This 
perspective is adopted by the article and serves as the reference point for measuring 
the EU’s actorness. In this context, actorness is the EU’s quality of having an impact 
on and shaping the ASEAN members’ state of affairs. It goes beyond mere action 
and is linked to the visibility and general perceptions by the sociological other. The 
succeeding paragraphs will define other central concepts and provide the setting for 
the subsequent analysis.
2  This term is to be understood as a rhetorical means and not as an ideal variable for gauging the relationship.
3   In this article the concept of ‘actorness’ is understood along the lines of Jürgen Rüland’s definition, which identifies 
an international entity as displaying actorness if it is identifiable and if it can aggregate and formulate its interests 
and implement these in its decision-making. 
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Interregionalism
This article assumes Heiner Hänggi’s definition of interregionalism as the classificat-
ion of a group-to-group type of interaction associated with old interregionalism4 
(Hänggi, 2000, p. 4) and extends it to EU NTS interaction of today. This implies that 
the interregional actorness relates to both the EU as a political entity represented 
by either the member states in the intergovernmental Common Foreign and Security 
Policy or by the European Commission (EC) in conjunction with ASEAN member states. 
Interregionalism can be in the form of the intergovernmental European Security and 
Defence Policy (ESDP) representing the EU in the case of the Aceh Monitoring Mission 
(AMM) or on a supranational basis building on the EC’s community competences 
such as in the shape of the Instrument for Stability or referring to the ASEAN-EU Joint 
Cooperation Committee. Since elaboration on the internal dimension of the EU’s 
external policy-making in the following case studies would extend the scope of this 
paper, the author regards the interplay of the EU institutions and their involvement in 
the EU external policy-making procedures and the institutional problems associated 
with this process as given. In addition to the emphasis on the interregional dimension, 
the article will also take into account bilateral responses between the individual 
ASEAN and EU member states in order to contextualise the interregional activities. 
Non-Traditional Security
In South-East Asia, alongside the importance of traditional military security, NTS is 
playing an increasingly important role in the light of the vulnerabilities of ASEAN 
member states to unconventional threats (Acharya, Caballero-Anthony, & Emmers, 
2006; Caballero-Anthony, 2009; Dosch, 2003). NTS is a relatively new security concept 
that has been introduced to capture the broadening and deepening of the security 
and threat agenda after the end of the Cold War (Buzan, Waever, & de Wilde, 1998). 
It describes security related to any form of threat perception that is short of the 
traditional state versus state pattern. Accordingly, NTS threats have a diverse nature. 
For instance, they can be ecological, terrorist and pandemic among others. In theory, 
4  In general, old interregionalism is correlated to the first wave of regionalism linked to the European Community’s 
trade and aid activities with regional groupings starting in the 1970s. For a detailed discussion of this form of 
interregionalism see, for instance, Hänggi (2006) or Söderbaum & Langenhove (2006).ASEAS 3(1)
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NTS redefines the security referent and thus necessitates new non-military security 
approaches.5  In  South-East  Asia  the  redefinition  of  the  individual  as  the  security 
referent is less prominent and Paul Evans explains
the resistance to connecting non[-]traditional security to human security is declining, though some 
remain worried that at least the narrow conception of human security is either inappropriate to Asia 
or will slow progress in getting state action in addressing the non-traditional security agenda. What is 
distinctive about many of the approaches to non[-]traditional security is (1) that they are ambiguous 
about whether the referent of security is the state or the individual and do not dwell on tensions between 
the two; and (2) that its advocates normally emphasi[s]e the state and state-centric means as the best 
ways of responding to these threats, normally preferring to address these issues within their own states 
rather than on a regional basis (Evans, 2004, p. 277).
Despite the potential of NTS to shift the security referent focus away from the state 
towards the individual in society and to open possibilities of non-military or civil-
military solutions, there still appears to be state- and military-centrism regarding 
NTS within ASEAN member states. Ongoing ASEAN member state rivalries and the 
“omni-enmeshment”6 of external powers are among the prominent variables shaping 
a security environment in line with the realist paradigm of hard power and state 
centrality. 
Given this security environment in South-East Asia that revolves around state-
centrism and hard security, one may wonder what security role there is for the EU to 
play in a region so far from Europe. 
The Non-Traditional Security Opportunity
NTS crises present an opportunity for the EU to play a stabilising role in the region. 
This role does not draw on hard power and strategic actorness in the narrow military 
sense. Instead, the EU assists, engages and achieves normalcy, security and stability 
predominantly  through  non-robust  and  civilian  means  that  are  not  necessarily 
considered  to  be  security  instruments.  Despite  some  EU  scepticism  towards  the 
concept, NTS renders it possible for the EU to help ASEAN member states with its full 
panoply of assistance measures. These range from development and humanitarian 
assistance to military assistance and allow the EU to be perceived as a security actor 
by the other side, although the European perspective does not rate all ASEAN NTS 
5  This redefinition of the security referent and the general individualisation of post-Cold War security have been 
described in detail by Hoadley (2006).
6   A term coined by Evelyn Goh to characterise South-East Asia’s security order, e.g. in Goh (2005).
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categories as security threats (EU High Representative Javier Solana, 2003). Hence, 
one may observe that from a South-East Asian perspective the EU already naturally 
behaves in an ‘identity-guided’ way; that is, it acts as an NTS crisis manager according 
to a pacifist and co-operative rationale that is guided by the founding values of the 
EU itself (European Union member states, 2007, title V, article 1.1.4). 
The Friends
The interregional partnership between the European Economic Community and the 
ASEAN member states dates back to the 1970s. During the Cold War, ASEAN showed 
great  interest  in  the  then  European  Community’s  integrationist,  economic  and 
external trade qualities. Back then the European Community seemed less interested 
in ASEAN. However, since Hans-Dietrich Genscher’s inauguration as West Germany’s 
Foreign Minister in 1974, the European Political Co-operation’s external dimension 
went  beyond  the  Middle  East  and  discovered  Asia,  and  with  it  ASEAN.  The  Asia 
Strategy of 1994 marked the EU’s post-Cold War rediscovery of Asia and ASEAN. It 
was a comprehensive document that ranged from economic to political and security 
to cultural co-operation reflected in the various dialogue fora in which both regional 
organisations meet. 
In spite of the multitude of newly initiated dialogue fora and the expansion of the 
agenda, the quality of the specific ASEAN-EU relationship had changed and become 
sidelined or rather a small puzzle piece in a pan-Asian approach. In the European 
Commission’s (EC) document on South-East Asia of 2003, the EC explicitly stated 
that the “[p]olitical dialogue should, to the extent possible, concentrate on region 
to region subjects of interest and concern, leaving global issues to ASEM” (European 
Commission, 2003, p. 13). In addition to this, another critical aspect is that despite 
the advancement of the EU’s relationship with ASEAN and its member states to a 
multi-sectoral and multi-dimensional friendship that echoes traces of a common 
lifeworld7, one rightly wonders about the EU’s true colours; not least, because of its 
7   Jürgen Habermas argues that the social actors who interact dialectically by seeking mutual understanding of the 
situation, intention, and action in order to agree to a reasoned consensus as the goal of the interaction must share a 
Lebenswelt (lifeworld). Habermas defines lifeworld as “the transcendental site where speaker and hearer meet, where 
they can reciprocally raise claims that their utterances fit the world (objective, social, or subjective), and where they 
can critici[s]e and confirm those validity claims, settle their disagreements, and arrive at agreements… Speakers and 
hearers come to an understanding from out of their common lifeworld about something in the objective, social, ASEAS 3(1)
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nebulous way of expressing its normative and material interests. 
The  squabbles  over  Myanmar,  human  rights,  and  EU  double  standards  have 
contributed to an obscure picture of the EU as a value-lecturing economic actor in the 
region (ASEAN member state official, personal communication, 21 November 2008). 
Self-proclaimed role concepts ranging from soft power to civilian power sometimes 
appear incongruent with the EU’s external actions. EU officials themselves admit that 
the EU is not clear in its external relations. It is explained, however, as a necessary 
aspect for the EU’s external relations in maintaining its international competitiveness 
on the one hand while living up to its values and normative standards on the other 
(EU official, personal communication, 16 February 2009). 
The current Partnership and Cooperation Agreement negotiations with individual 
ASEAN countries – after the EU’s interregional approach failed – verifies that the EU 
is indeed to some extent consistent in projecting its core founding values (ASEAN 
member state official, personal communication, 15 December 2008). However, these 
negotiations  have  also  displayed  the  failure  of  the  interregional  dimension  with 
ASEAN and an alleged increasing flexibility in wording on the EU side. This alleged 
flexibility in wording does not signify the corruption of the EU’s core values but can 
be, for example, a different nuance in the formulation of EU values and principles (EU 
official, personal communication, 16 February 2009). Interacting with the EU remains 
a confusing experience from time to time. In general, the EU’s external relations 
are  a  balancing  act  between  interests  and  values  and  norms  depending  on  the 
counterpart’s bargaining power, the issue-area of the dialogue, the type of dialogue 
forum (e.g. bilateral versus multilateral), and other elements the discussion of which 
would extend the scope of this article. Important for this paper are not the individual 
elements but the mere premise that the EU considers that these materialist and 
ideational factors and their interplay to be vital in the EU’s decision-making process 
for the outside world. 
It  appears  that  the  official  EU  rhetoric  of  friendship  and  its  insistence  on 
ideational commonalities with ASEAN are more forced than natural. In spite of the 
EU’s long-standing and comprehensive interregional relationship with ASEAN that 
or subjective worlds” (1987, p. 126). When communicating, the actors make truth or validity claims and refer to 
the common lifeworld as their source of justification. Depending on the degree of divergence of the lifeworlds, 
international actors will find it easier or harder to come up with a shared normative pre-understanding in order to 
establish an arena for meaningful interaction and a deep and long-term co-operation. 
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has managed to survive the Myanmar and East Timor issues and other cases of 
ideational disagreements, ASEAN-EU interregionalism has not progressed to a deep 
dialogue and channel of co-operation of major priority to either side. ASEAN’s post-
Cold War orientation has shifted mainly to the regional powers in its neighbourhood. 
In particular, China has been increasingly engaged in various bilateral, regional and 
sub-regional dialogue structures and co-operative projects. From the EU perspective, 
ASEAN and its member states have always lived in the shadow of others, be it African 
countries when it comes to the EU’s development policy or be it, formerly, Japan and 
currently, India and China when it comes to the EU’s external trade policy with Asia. 
In the last decade, some ASEAN member states have found it difficult to cope 
with the various forms of NTS crises that have struck the region. These crises and, in 
particular, the tsunami of December 2004 have raised the EU’s awareness of ASEAN 
and have displayed a niche where the EU as a latecomer can gain ground in the 
region. In fact, Evans has already observed an increase in both European Track 1 and 
2 involvements in the region since 1996 (Evans, 2000). The EU’s accession to ASEAN’s 
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), its non-strategic nature in South-East Asia, its 
emphasis on the soft security paradigm and its possession of humanitarian, civilian 
and crisis management capabilities with which it can face a broad spectrum of NTS 
threats make the EU, in theory, a suitable partner for ASEAN member states in this 
field. Moreover, NTS crises within ASEAN are ideal opportunities for the EU to provide 
assistance, display its multi-headed and -dimensional actorness, and exert influence 
as a new type of political and security actor and to demonstrate the real quality of 
this interregional friendship.
True Colours of a Friend
The EU is one of the most advanced regional organisations with regard to preparedness 
for transnational and NTS crisis scenarios. The following case studies will outline the 
EU’s activities with and within ASEAN member states after NTS crises in South-East 
Asia and analyse whether the EU has managed to translate its NTS potential into 
tangible actorness.ASEAS 3(1)
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Avian Influenza
In the case of a pandemic influenza or other communicable and pathogenic diseases 
the regional comparative studies on pandemic influenza preparedness suggest that 
the EU model of co-ordination with the individual national plans can be exemplary 
for other regions. Among others, the World Health Organisation (WHO) has been 
recommending the European model in terms of legislation, contingency planning, 
approaches to surveillance and veterinary services for the Asia-Pacific region (Coker 
& Mounier-Jack, 2006, p. 26). The WHO and others believe that the Asia-Pacific and 
other regions can learn from the European model and experience. 
In 2003, an avian influenza outbreak threatened South-East Asia. The individual 
member  states  were  affected  differently  and  effective  national  responses  were 
dependent  on  the  degree  of  development  of  each  member  state.  Regional  co-
ordination  among  the  ASEAN  member  states  was  marginal  in  the  immediate 
aftermath of the crisis. International organisations such as the WHO were vital in 
tackling the crisis. In 2006, the WHO established a Regional Pandemic Preparedness 
Plan to complement national poultry control plans as well as human epidemic plans. 
Until now, there are ASEAN member countries such as Vietnam which continue to 
experience this form of influenza (World Organisation for Animal Health, 2009). There 
are a variety of factors ranging from poverty to culture to political institutions that 
aggravate the containment of, fight against, and the development of preparedness 
for communicable diseases in the majority of ASEAN member states. 
In the case of the avian influenza, the EU possessed the expertise and resources 
to provide assistance to affected ASEAN member states. In comparison to ASEAN 
member states’ national activities that were mainly funded and supported by the 
international community, the EU’s direct support to ASEAN member states in the 
form of EC and bilateral member state to member state assistance appeared to be 
more like a drop in the bucket (European Commission, 2008). Beyond the marginal 
amount of technical and financial assistance to affected ASEAN members (e.g. the 
study on gender aspects of the avian influenza crisis in Laos, Vietnam and Thailand; 
an  EU  experts’  delegation  and  financial  support  to  Vietnam  etc.),  the  EU’s  main 
activities to support affected ASEAN member states were on the international level. 
The EC collaborated and continues to co-operate with various international partners 
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such as the WHO and other third parties on aid for South-East Asia concerning the 
avian influenza. 
At the International Pledging Conference on Avian and Human Pandemic Influenza 
from 17-18 January 2006 in Beijing, the EU made available EUR80 million mainly to 
affected Asian countries. This amount was channelled through the Avian and Human 
Influenza Facility of the World Bank. So far, the EU has allocated approximately EUR413 
million of the total international contribution of USD2.8 billion that is available for the 
international avian influenza crisis response (European Commission, 2008). Hence, 
the EU is the second largest donor.
This case shows that the EU has played a crucial financial role in increasing the 
level  of  preparedness  within  the  ASEAN  region  and  elsewhere  in  the  world.  The 
EU’s involvement with helping South-East Asia predominantly takes place through 
the World Bank. This alleviates the EU’s administrative burden and reinforces the 
EU’s preference for multilateralism. However, being part of a bigger international 
coalition degrades the EU’s actual visibility and actorness on site. Specific examples 
of EU actorness in the form of dialogue, the provision of expertise, bilateral financial 
assistance and research in the region has been limited. The EU’s impact in combating 
the avian influenza has been virtually invisible for the South-East Asian counterpart. 
Furthermore, this case shows that the EU did not take full advantage of its issue-
specific expertise, financial capacity, and goodwill to project its level of regional 
preparedness into other regions. This is linked to many reasons such as the patchy 
nature of the crisis itself, which affected the ASEAN member states unevenly. In 
addition, the underdeveloped regional cohesion in the counterpart region also played 
an inhibiting role for interregional action and responses.
Development and Humanitarian Assistance
The oldest form of European NTS assistance, which is implied in the above case, 
has been the EC’s and the EU member states’ development policies which indirectly 
target NTS threats. They pre-empt and defuse potential outbreaks of NTS crises via 
tackling core vulnerabilities. In spite of the EU’s and its member states’ increased 
efforts of mainstreaming the development-security nexus in development policies, 
this “appears to be more of a conceptual battleground pitching the development ASEAS 3(1)
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and security communities against each other” (Young, 2008, p. 422). For the EC’s 
aid agency, EuropeAID, this linkage has not changed its primary objective, which is 
to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) and not security (EU official, 
personal  communication,  17  February  2009).  Arguably,  the  EuropeAID  official 
refers to state-centric forms of security since the MDGs coincide with the concept 
of  human  security,  which  is  a  recognised  security  concept  in  the  EU  (European 
Council, 2008). This shows that the EU is struggling to strike a balance between 
its commitments to comprehensive security and the securitisation of policy sectors 
that an efficient response in South-East Asia demands. The programmes financed by 
EuropeAID provide a long-term dimension concerned with sustainable development 
and attaining the basal requirements for human security, eliminating the breeding 
grounds that contribute to NTS crises. 
In addition to the EC’s development assistance, there are also other communitarian 
non-security policy sectors that have specific external programmes and both indirectly 
and directly address the long-term dimension in the prevention of NTS crises. In 
accordance with the European Security Strategy (ESS) “in pursuing [its] strategic 
objectives[, the EU] applies … the full spectrum of instruments for crisis management 
and conflict prevention at [its] disposal, including political, diplomatic, military and 
civilian, trade and development activities” (EU High Representative Javier Solana, 
2003). In rhetoric, the EU’s development policy and other policy areas complement 
the goals of the ESS. This strategy paper and its follow-up document of December 
2008 imply that the EU’s comprehensive understanding of and approach to security 
is linking it with other non-security policy fields beyond the development-security 
nexus. From a European perspective, this does not signify a factual securitisation 
of the non-security policy fields but the recognition of the interconnectedness of 
achieving stability and security via a cross-sectoral approach. 
For  instance,  the  contemporary  securitised  debate  on  climate  change  has  led 
to  a  linkage  of  climate  change  and  international  security  whereas  a  decade  ago 
environmental issues were mainly associated with sustainable development. In the 
environmental field, ASEAN and the EU have been active dialogue partners on this 
on both informal and formal levels such as within the ASEAN-EU Ministerial Meeting 
(AEMM)  framework.  By  1996,  the  ASEM  dialogue  framework  provided  a  second 
channel to the ASEAN-EU dialogue forum, in which this topic could be discussed in a 
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wider Asian context between both sides. 
At ASEM 2 in London in 1998, the Chairman’s statement said 
to take forward work in co-operation on environmental disaster preparedness including both short and 
long-term programmes, such as DIPECHO [Disaster Preparedness European Commission Humanitarian 
Aid Office], to strengthen environmental disaster management capacities in South-East Asia to enable 
countries to cope better with the threats posed by disasters affecting the natural environment including 
forest (ASEM member states, 1998, para. 22). 
This  statement  indicates  the  EU’s  view  that  South-East  Asian  states  are  having 
difficulties managing natural and environmental crises. It emphasises the importance 
of the EU’s apolitical DIPECHO programme, launched by the European Commission 
Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO) in 1996, in increasing disaster preparedness in the 
region. Already since 1992, ECHO has been active in giving humanitarian assistance in 
South-East Asia and reducing the impact of earthquakes, floods typhoons, landslides, 
but, also of political conflicts in the region. The tsunami at the end of 2004 was such 
an event where within a week ECHO had its assistance mobilised and, seemingly, the 
EU has inverted its low interest in conflict-prone Aceh. 
Tsunami and Political Conflict in Aceh
ECHO distributed financial assistance to UN agencies but also to non-governmental 
organisations that were on site. On the day of the tsunami, the EC immediately granted 
financial support to the International Committee of the Red Cross and activated the 
Community Civil Protection Mechanism which co-ordinated experts from various 
EU member states. Within the first weeks after the catastrophe, the EC allocated 
humanitarian assistance to the WHO, the UN Children’s Fund and other big agencies. 
The financial contribution was co-ordinated by the UN’s Office of Humanitarian Affairs 
to alleviate the suffering caused by the tsunami. By February 2005, ECHO had given 
EUR103 million for humanitarian assistance (European Commission Humanitarian Aid 
Office, 2008). By April 2005, the EC had activated three Rapid Reaction Mechanisms 
(RRM) for post-tsunami recovery. Alongside the immediate humanitarian responses, 
the EC also aimed for long-term sustainable recovery responses. The EC and the EU 
member states were leading financial contributors to the multi-donor trust fund 
(MDF) of EUR440 million (85 percent of the total budget for Indonesia’s post-tsunami 
recovery was donated by the EU and its member states) for Indonesia’s recovery ASEAS 3(1)
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and an important expertise provider for sustainable reconstruction and increasing 
the  early-warning  capacity  and  general  preparedness  of  Aceh  (Delegation  of  the 
European Commission to Indonesia and Brunei Darussalam, 2009). The Delegation of 
the European Commission to Indonesia and Brunei Darussalam states 
a total of €871.4 million has been provided and committed by the EC and EU Member States for relief 
efforts, reconstruction assistance and the peace process in Aceh. These contributions were provided 
through the MDF and direct bilateral aid through United Nations Agencies, Government of Indonesia 
and non-governmental organisations (Delegation of the European Commission to Indonesia and Brunei 
Darussalam, 2009). 
Here again, the EC’s substantial financial contributions did not translate into the 
adequate proportional actorness visibility that one would expect given the amounts 
involved. Nevertheless, with regard to the EC’s flanking projects and the establishment 
of the Europe House in Aceh, the EU was able to make its mark as a humanitarian 
and normative actor committed to the province. In fact, according to the perceptions 
study of the EU in Asia by the National Centre for Research on Europe in New Zealand, 
the Indonesian public was the only society in South-East Asia that perceived the EU as 
a normative actor and democracy promoter (National Centre for Research on Europe, 
2006-ongoing). 
Parallel to the tsunami recovery measures, the EC as well as Javier Solana were 
supportive of former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari and the Crisis Management 
Initiative who brokered the peace negotiations and mediated a peace agreement 
between the two conflicting parties in Aceh (Schulze, 2007, p. 5). The EC funded the 
mediation between the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) and the Government of Indonesia 
(GoI) as well as the Initial Monitoring Presence of the ESDP in Aceh. 
The tsunami compelled the GoI to welcome humanitarian aid from outside, which 
among other factors facilitated the mediation process between the GAM and the 
GoI leading to the AMM implemented by the ESDP and five ASEAN member states. 
The tsunami provided the opportunity for the EU to distinguish itself as a global NTS 
player in response to the natural and political crises in Aceh. 
The political conflict in Aceh presents a different case to the previous examples 
of EU NTS crisis actorness in South-East Asia due to two distinct features. First, the 
AMM drew on the intergovernmental ESDP instrument. Second, it was launched in 
response to man-made violence, namely an ethno-political crisis of thirty years with 
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various impacts. Since the end of the Suharto administration there were two attempts 
at peace-talks and ceasefires prior to the EU’s engagement and both failed. In 2000, 
the Switzerland-based Henri Dunant Centre negotiated a humanitarian ceasefire and 
in 2001, the Indonesian Parliament passed a Special Autonomy Law for the territory. 
This legislation allowed Aceh to manage a considerable extent of its own affairs 
and defined a greater share for Aceh of natural resources revenues. Despite these 
developments GAM and the security forces continued to make individual attacks. 
In a second attempt to stop the violence the Henri Dunant Centre mediated the 
Cessation of Hostilities Agreement between the GoI and GAM on December 9, 2002. 
Its implementation was monitored by delegates from Thailand and the Philippines. 
Both  ceasefires  negotiated  by  the  Henri-Dunant  Centre  were  brittle  and  did  not 
work since they lacked the genuine support of the antagonists. On the GAM side, 
the ceasefires were only welcomed for the purpose of recovery. On the GoI side, the 
Indonesian military and the security forces did not have an interest in creating peace 
with the ‘terrorists’ and had managed to contain GAM activities over two decades. 
In comparison to the previous peace processes, the advantage of the AMM was 
that it was based on an actual Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) that had been 
agreed to by both parties to the conflict as the basis of action. The mandate was clear 
and designed to 
monitor the demobilisation of GAM and monitor and assist with the decommissioning and destruction 
of its weapons, ammunition and explosives; monitor the relocation of non-organic military forces and 
non-organic police troops; monitor the reintegration of active GAM members; monitor the human rights 
situation and provide assistance in this field in the context of the tasks set out in points (a), (b) and (c) 
above; monitor the process of legislation change; rule on disputed amnesty cases; investigate and rule on 
complaints and alleged violations of the MoU and establish and maintain liaison and good cooperation 
with the parties (Council of the European Union, 2006, para. 5.2).
This then became the basis for the European Council’s Joint Action. The mission 
has been completed and is considered to be a success since the mandate had been 
implemented in all its aspects to a more or less satisfying extent.8 Most importantly, 
there is still peace in Aceh and the region is undergoing a democratic transformation 
with the first parliamentary elections in 2009.
The case of the AMM is different from the previous cases because it shows the EU 
as the essential actor in operationalising and implementing the MoU in an impartial 
8   For a detailed assessment of the individual tasks please read Schulze (2009).ASEAS 3(1)
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manner and thus effectively addressing an NTS crisis within an ASEAN country. The 
impact of the EU during the course of the crisis is clear and of high significance post-
MoU. The AMM is the first case of the EU having drawn on its specific ESDP toolkit 
and sending civilian troops to South-East Asia whereas in the cases of the pandemic 
and environmental external co-operation, the EC has been the main force behind the 
EU’s action. These previous NTS issue-specific cases show that the communitarian 
measures have been mainly in the form of verbal support through dialogue and 
financial and technical assistance. The AMM shows a different facet of EU actorness 
in South-East Asia because the EU deployed intergovernmental civil-military staff and 
capabilities to implement peace. 
The success of the AMM and the clear contribution of EU NTS actorness would have 
been less likely had there not been several transnational and NTS crises in the South-
East Asian region. These crises have paved the way for this engagement by contesting 
the utility of upholding the principle of non-interference so cherished by ASEAN 
states. In 1997, following the coup d’état in Cambodia, Acting Prime Minister Anwar 
Ibrahim raised concerns about ASEAN’s adherence to the non-interference principle. 
He argued that in a time where national problems can spill over onto the regional 
level there should be a change of principle towards constructive intervention (Haacke, 
1999, p. 582). However, Anwar Ibrahim did not receive any support from other ASEAN 
members. In June 1998, Thai Foreign Minister Surin Pitsuwan received more support 
in his reassessment of the non-interference principle but could not weaken Suharto’s 
influence and hard stance on this matter (Haacke, 1999, p. 582). Nevertheless, these 
instances show that prior to the tsunami a marginal, but nonetheless significant, 
erosive process of the principle of non-interference has set in.
Asian Financial Crisis (AFC)
The case of the AFC9 was the key transnational and NTS crisis which had devastating 
economic and financial effects on ASEAN markets and led to the above critical self-
reflection of some ASEAN member state officials on how the contagious effect of 
9  The AFC can be considered as an NTS crisis in the broadest sense with regard to the current global financial 
meltdown and the rising prominence of the concept of financial security. Since the incidence of the AFC, financial 
security has become an acceptable concept exhibiting the tight enmeshment of the socio-economic and security 
fields. Despite its socio-economic categorisation, the AFC and the international financial crisis (IFC) of 2009 illustrate 
that financial security is a concept linked to human security and the stability and security of a political entity.
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the crisis could have been mitigated. This implied an increasingly critical view of 
the normative core of ASEAN’s modus operandi. The ASEAN way of intra-mural co-
operation and, in particular, the principle of non-interference were questioned in 
connection to the transnationalisation of stability issues and security threats. 
The AFC broke out in Thailand and became a contagious implosion of the financial 
markets throughout the South-East Asian and the wider East Asian region. In response 
to the crisis and complementing national, regional and international efforts, the EC 
and  its  member  states  channelled  USD154  billion  through  international  financial 
institutions (IFI) to support the affected countries (Brittan, 1999, p. 492). This amount 
accounted for 18 percent of the total sum that was allocated to IFIs. Only Japan 
provided more financial help in this crisis (Brittan, 1999, p. 492). Another East Asian 
power that contributed to the recovery was China. Its assistance was less financial 
and it continued to threaten South-East Asia on territorial matters in the case of the 
Spratly Islands, but by not devaluating its currency it played a major role in upholding 
a certain degree of stability of the markets in the region (Bowles, 2002, p. 239). 
Despite the EU’s major financial contribution through the IMF, concrete EU or 
ASEAN-EU  initiatives  were  scarce.  The  crisis  occurred  at  a  time  when  ASEAN-EU 
interregional dialogue and co-operation were at a low-point because of Myanmar’s 
accession to ASEAN in 1997. Alternatively, ASEM provided a channel of communication 
for the two sides to meet. At ASEM 2, the EU came up with the ASEM Asia Financial 
Crisis Response Trust Fund, a European Financial Expertise Network and a trade and 
investment pledge (ASEM member states, 1998). Furthermore, the Kobe Research 
Project was initiated at the third ASEM Finance Ministers’ Meeting on 13-14 January 
2001 in Kobe. In spite of these European signs of solidarity with ASEAN countries 
and others in the region, these activities appear to be little more than a drop in 
the bucket. Indeed, the EU has provided considerable financial support, but the IMF 
and the World Bank have been the visible actors. These organisations’ actorness is 
borne by the international community’s financial contributions and thus also by the 
amount given by the EU and its member states. EU-associated assistance and impact 
was visible only in relation to the ASEM framework. However, in this connection, the 
Asian side considered the ASEM-related activities marginal because the EU’s visibility 
was limited by the World Bank’s administrative control over the ASEM Asia Financial 
Crisis Response Trust Fund I and II. ‘Brand EU’ as a financial security and stability ASEAS 3(1)
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payer in the region cannot be shaped if the EU contributors are only marginally 
involved in Fund projects and are non-visible on site and only receive reporting.
Conclusively, the major visible actors which have influenced the recovery phase 
were the IMF, the East Asian neighbours, and the national authorities within ASEAN. 
The latter have played a very important role in creating post-AFC national financial 
preparedness  and  resilience.  This  post-crisis  resilience  in  many  affected  ASEAN 
member  states  was  facilitated  and  conditioned  by  the  IMF.  However,  it  was  the 
protectionist measures of national authorities such as the Malaysian Government 
that among other reasons contributed to the relative low-key impact of the global 
financial crisis in 2008 within ASEAN countries (Asian Think Tank representative, 
personal communication, 10 November 2008). The AFC clearly displays, yet again, 
that in cases of regional crises in a specific sector of governance and of international 
concern the EU deems it appropriate to act within the issue-specific multilateral and 
international framework concerned. 
So far, this paper has elaborated on the EU’s post-crisis security impact on NTS 
cases  in  the  broadest  sense  where,  due  to  the  policy  sectors,  the  EC  has  been 
identified to be the major force behind EU actorness. This indicates that the EU 
and its member states are de facto on the right path in mainstreaming security and 
providing a comprehensive toolkit for NTS responses to South-East Asia. 
In view of the European Council being the major body for external security and 
stability in the form of the EU’s foreign and security policy, additional cases of an 
EU intergovernmental response to that of the AMM can shed more light on both 
the specific role competences as well as the interplay between communitarian and 
intergovernmental NTS instruments. In this paper, the AMM has been the only case 
elaborated, where the European Council played a crucial security role. The following 
and final case study will highlight another NTS case dealt with by national authorities 
and the intergovernmental mode of response. The next example is the impact of the 
Bali bombings on October 12, 2002. 
Bali Bombings
Terrorism and extremism have been brought to the top of the international and 
interregional security agenda since the September 11 terrorist attacks. In spite of 
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the USA having dubbed South-East Asia as its Second Front on its War on Terror, 
the ASEAN member states did not want to succumb to American pressure and face 
any intrusion upon their national prerogative to combat terrorism and extremism. 
Furthermore, the terrorist threat within individual ASEAN states has been regarded 
as  an  ethno-nationalist  concern  (Acharya  &  Acharya,  2007,  p.  80).  The  Muslim-
dominated societies of Malaysia and Indonesia were initially reluctant to be part of 
the Second Front:
Notwithstanding  their  sensitivity  about  the  US  role  in  regional  counterterrorism  efforts,  ASEAN 
members such as Malaysia and Indonesia have been receptive to US assistance that does not involve 
direct US military engagement. After Malaysia’s initial misgivings about the RMSI [Regional Maritime 
Security Initiative], which it saw as a pretext for US enforcement operations in Southeast Asian waters, 
it expanded cooperation with the United States and others... (Acharya & Acharya, 2007, p. 88). 
The Bali bombings in 2002 and President Bush’s visit to Indonesia in 2003 were decisive 
in mitigating the resentments. Since then, the USA, Australia and a number of affected 
ASEAN member states have been active in co-operating on the fight against terrorism 
and extremism. Australia’s engagement is not least due to its proximity to Indonesia 
and the high death toll of Australians in the 2002 Bali bombings, which left 202 people 
dead and 209 injured (Australian Federal Police, 2008). The impact of this attack 
increased securitisation in ASEAN countries and stimulated various intra-ASEAN and 
ASEAN member states-USA counter-terrorist co-operation projects addressing the 
strategic and operational dimension of the jihadist trend. The Philippines, Indonesia, 
Malaysia and Thailand became the main addressees of international counter-terrorist 
co-operation in South-East Asia (US official, personal communication, 4 December 
2009).
In contrast to the USA and Australia, the EC and the EU member states have taken a 
less direct approach in counter-terrorist-related activities with ASEAN member states, 
such as efforts to improve border management and document security, interfaith 
dialogues, anti-money-laundering, and intelligence sharing within the frameworks of 
ASEAN-EU and ASEM. Any regional responsive action or declaration regarding the Bali 
bombings would fall under the umbrella of the European Council. In fact, one must 
admit that given the national centrality of counter-terrorism, the EC can, according 
to its restricted competence, only contribute minimal relevant funding and expertise 
provision and thus a truly interregional approach to this highly sensitive matter is ASEAS 3(1)
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impossible and, in the light of the varying degrees to which ASEAN member states are 
affected, inadequate. The majority of tangible European counter-terrorist assistance 
has been a patchwork from specific EU member states to specific ASEAN member 
states. It has been, in particular, the British, Dutch, French, Spanish, and Danish that 
have  sponsored  and  provided  expertise,  for  instance,  for  direct  counter-terrorist 
training seminars and workshops.10 
Immediately after the attacks, the EC offered anti-money-laundering assistance 
under  the  RRM  to  Indonesia.  Javier  Solana  responded  with  a  statement  of 
condemnation  of  the  bombings  and  on  18  October  2002,  the  European  Council 
published its conclusions on the attacks, which recommended ways the EU could 
assist Indonesia but neglected human rights concerns.
However, whilst the EU may well be correct in supporting the Indonesian efforts to implement measures 
in conformity with Security Council Resolution 1373, the EU should take account of the Indonesian 
government’s very poor record in human rights and respect for the rule of law in the management of its 
internal affairs (Gregory, 2005, p. 113).
The response was limited and remained declaratory. This is unsurprising in view of 
the EU’s considering other regions such as the Middle East and Central Asia to be 
the areas of priority in connection to terrorism and extremism (EU official, personal 
communication, 13 February 2009). 
ASEAN-EU counter-terrorist activities are mainly long-term oriented and have been 
initiated after the fire-fighting phase post-Bali bombings. They have been limited 
to specific niches that provide added value to other international counter-terrorist 
projects with ASEAN member states. Beside the ASEM and ASEAN-EU declarations 
on combating international terrorism, verbal commitments, and interfaith dialogues 
targeting  the  cultural  and  ideological  basis  of  extremism  and  terrorism,  the  so-
called other EU or European activities are not necessarily to be regarded as distinct 
interregional or EU initiatives. They complement the American and Australian Western 
counter-terrorist  projects  with  supplementary  efforts  consisting  of  bilateral  EU-
ASEAN and bilateral member state-to-member state contributions. Noteworthy also 
is the co-operation that has been sparked in the policing sector by the Co-operation 
Agreement between the ASEAN Chiefs of Police (Aseanapol) and the International 
10   For further details please view e.g. the course overview of the International Law Enforcement Academy (http://
www.ileabangkok.com),  Jakarta  Centre  for  Law  Enforcement  Co-operation  (http://www.jeclec.com)  and  the 
Southeast Asian Regional Centre for Counter-Terrorism (http://www.searcct.gov.my). 
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Criminal Police Organisation (Interpol). It provided for a database-sharing project 
between  these  two  police  intelligence  agencies  and  other  agencies  such  as  the 
European Police Office (Europol).
EU Non-Traditional Security Actorness and Implications for  
ASEAN-EU Interregionalism
The  discussion  of  the  case  studies  to  show  the  EU’s  true  colours  from  an  NTS 
perspective has revealed that the EU draws on a vast range of supranational and 
intergovernmental, short- and long-term, responsive and pre-emptive instruments. 
The conglomeration of different types of action illustrates seven central features of 
EU NTS actorness in South-East Asia. 
First, the overall tenor of the case studies and other crises within the ASEAN 
region demonstrates that the EU has tended to recourse to ECHO’s humanitarian 
assistance most frequently in response to these NTS crises, but also to conflict-related 
humanitarian crises. Furthermore, it emphasises the importance of long-term EU 
development assistance to defuse crises and pinpoints the different conceptions of 
security and development of the two regions.
Second, it becomes evident that the different interests and development stages of 
the various nation-states as well as the different degree of integration of the regional 
organisations limit co-operation. In general, one also has to consider that the logic 
behind EU actorness and co-operation follows a pattern of rationality which takes 
into account a number of action-inhibiting variables. For example, the EU policy-
makers contemplate the variety of existing multilateral fora, the global distribution 
of power, existing crisis-response measures on various levels, national sensitivities, 
and other obstacles that could impair any form of ASEAN-EU interregional action. 
Following this process of contemplation the EU then decides if and how to respond 
to crises abroad. 
Third, it reveals that the problems of shared competences within the EU structure 
are also reflected in the EU’s external relations and that shared external representation 
minimises the collective actorness perception by the sociological other.
Fourth, since the EU is by definition multilateralist, the preferred framework of 
action appears to be within a multilateral framework on varying levels depending ASEAS 3(1)
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on the issue and the spread of the negative impact. In most cases, the EU’s crisis 
response was limited to financial and technical assistance under the aegis of an 
international organisation specifically concerned with the issue-area. On the one 
hand, this alleviates the EU’s administrative burden and allows the EU to circumvent 
conflicts with the receiving country should the recipient disagree on the conditions 
of assistance. On the other hand, this weakens the visibility and actual impact of 
the  EU’s  actorness  in  South-East  Asia.  The  EU  needs  to  re-evaluate  its  priorities 
regarding actorness and rebalance security and image-building costs and benefits. At 
the moment, it seems unable to translate its major share in technical and financial 
assistance  into  factual  visibility,  influence  and  power  presence.  It  appears  to  be 
more a security payer than a security player, an assessment that applies to the EU’s 
activities in other parts of the world such as in the Middle East peace process.
Fifth, the case of terrorism indicates the potential of the functional approach for 
EU NTS actorness as in the case of Aseanapol’s international co-operation.
Sixth, alongside the various EU efforts to promote Indonesia’s leadership role in 
ASEAN, the presence of the EU in Aceh probably also contributed to the Indonesian 
public’s perception of the EU as a normative power and democracy promoter. Hence, 
increased on site engagement in South-East Asia and the establishment of a permanent 
presence such as the Europe House in Aceh may enhance and differentiate the EU’s 
visibility and thus, its actorness.
Finally, the case studies suggest that ASEAN-EU interregionalism in the field of 
NTS is not an established layer in the pyramid of global governance, but rather a 
vaguely defined and blurry interface of the global and regional level. Depending on 
the nature of the NTS crisis the EU will choose its level of response. This has exposed 
the ASEAN-EU level as a weak and declaratory remedy. In fact, the only case in which 
the EU managed to make a significant impact on the crisis situation and contribute 
to  the  strengthening  of  the  ASEAN-EU  interregional  level  has  been  the  AMM.  In 
this case, it and the five ASEAN member states have managed to alter a situation 
of  violence  and  high  vulnerability  to  a  situation  of  ongoing  peace  and  reduced 
armament. Furthermore, it ignited an enhanced ASEAN-EU interest in deepening this 
interregional dialogue format. This was illustrated by the AEMM agenda in Nuremberg 
and the following Plan of Action in 2007 (ASEAN-EU member states, 2007). 
The EU appears to have interest in the region and has become sporadically engaged 
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in direct activities that reveal its presence and solidarity. However, the EU and its 
member states have not made any visible substantial impact as a collective actor – 
whether interregional or in any other form – in tackling the previously mentioned 
crises and in assisting ASEAN member states to become more crisis-prepared and 
less vulnerable. As discussed above, in the majority of the cases, the EU is in a queue 
with other international helpers, and has not been able to set itself apart. It has 
distinguished itself as a major development player, which, from an Asian perspective, 
is part of NTS. However, with regard to NTS crises, when vulnerabilities become 
aggravated to the point of being matters of life and death, the EU has not established 
its role as either an NTS or general security actor in South-East Asia. Moreover, in 
most of the cases it took the role of a financial and flanking presence rather than an 
active shaper of the recovery. As partially listed above, there is a broad range from 
cultural to structural to materialist to systemic inhibitors that constitute this under-
achievement.  The  EU’s  preference  for  international  and  multilateral  frameworks 
when appropriate, the EU’s strategic geographical areas of priority, the interests of 
other actors (e.g. US American power politics), and the normative sensitivities of the 
counterpart epitomised in the ASEAN Way are among the most prominent reasons 
in the case studies. In spite of its overall sporadic engagement, this patchwork of 
individual cases of EU actorness is interlocking with the EU’s overall cross-sectoral 
external security strategy and does illustrate a specific, albeit restricted, type of EU 
NTS actorness within ASEAN after NTS crises. 
The EU is an unconventional multi-headed actor whose concept of security is 
based on a comprehensive understanding of security and a soft security approach 
drawing on preferably holistic, multilateralist and non-robust instruments. The EU 
does not think in terms of power politics in South-East Asia and therefore it is not 
really perceived as a traditional security actor among the leaders of ASEAN member 
states. In their opinion, it possesses the security culture and means to become a 
recognised NTS actor in relation to human security (former Secretary General of 
ASEAN Rodolfo Severino, personal communication, 24 November 2008). 
The DIPECHO programme, the EU’s involvement in the first-ever ARF Voluntary 
Demonstration of Response on Disaster Relief from 4-8 May 2009, the various ARF 
seminars  and  workshops  on  NTS  such  as  the  ARF  Seminar  to  Enhance  Maritime 
Security from 5-6 March 2009, in Surabaya (EU-Indonesia), or the ARF Seminar on ASEAS 3(1)
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International Security Implications of Climate-related Events and Trends in Phnom 
Penh  from  19-20  March  2009  (EU-Cambodia),  and  numerous  other  NTS-related 
activities  of  the  ASEAN-EU  Indicative  Lists  of  Activities  2007-2008  and  2009-2010 
pursuant to the Nuremberg Declaration and Plan of Action suggest that the EU has 
recognised the potential of increased actorness in certain NTS niches. These niches 
are namely climate change and disaster management and emergency response. With 
particular regard to the ASEAN-EU level, the Nuremberg meeting has stimulated a 
dynamic that stresses interregional NTS activities in accordance with the ASEAN 
Community Blueprints. The Lists of Activities in the field of political and security 
co-operation indicate that both sides are building on the Nuremberg momentum 
and are aiming to develop the ASEAN-EU level to a meaningful dialogue sphere with 
tangible and not merely rhetorical outcomes that contribute to ASEAN’s integration 
and, eventually, stimulate further co-operation and joint positions in other fora on 
the regional and global level:
Exploit the potential of multilateral fora
1.1.4. Develop ASEAN-EU consultations/cooperation in multilateral fora, including in the United Nations 
and other bodies within the UN system as well as in Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), in order to strengthen 
the multilateral system and, where appropriate, to develop joint positions; and
1.1.5. Enhance the role of multilateral cooperation in Asia, including through the accession of the EU/EC to 
the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) (ASEAN-EU member states, 2007).
Conclusions
In the light of the broad spectrum of responses to and cases of transnational and NTS 
crises, the EU’s actorness manifests itself inconsistently, patchily, and on a case-by-
case basis. In general, the vast and cluttered choice of prominent cases of NTS crises 
in this article emblematises and reflects the ephemeral and sporadic nature of the 
EU’s NTS interregional actorness. There exists ambition for increased interregional 
dialogue and co-operation on specific NTS issues. Furthermore, it can be seen that 
a putative area for increased EU actorness may be more hypothetical than feasible. 
On the one hand, it may be evidence of a lack of, or the mere rudimentary existence 
of, a common lifeworld that impedes deeper interaction. On the other hand, there 
are a variety  of  internal  and external variables that  limit  EU  NTS  actorness  and 
these are more relevant than the ASEAN-EU interregional level. Internal and external 
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hurdles need to be overcome on both sides for a more tangible and meaningful 
ASEAN-EU  interregional  political  and  security  partnership  and  friendship  shaping 
global governance. Furthermore, this prospect appears to be confined to the future 
exploration  of  co-operation  within  small  niches  of  NTS,  on  which  the  EU  has 
already embarked. In the long term, the EU might then become more consistent 
and pronounced in its NTS actorness after crises in South-East Asia and be perceived 
as more than merely a regional model and fair-weather friend who in view of the 
success of the AMM indeed can be relied on as a friend in deed. 
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